Part 2: Surtie’s inheritance money converted to SA – Bonds immanent in ‘splits’ and ‘strips’ detailing an intricate concealment strategy initiated by apartheid players but perfected by democratic era Treasury to the benefit of hitherto an unknown group of beneficiaries

By: Clyde Ramalaine

In part one of this series,  we attempted to give the historical context for a claim of arguably the most significant financial and economic crime committed in the last 30 years of South Africa. An offence for the complicity of apartheid and democratic era role players. Injustice for the Surtie family, who since 1984 is fighting to receive what is rightfully theirs. The estimated value of the crime and the loss to the Surtie Family is U$D 165,9bn. This calculation is predicated only on the interest yield return over 30 year period from 1984-2014. Cognisant of the interest that would have been earned on the interest paid in conjunction with the period post-2014 to include five more years leading up to 2019, [excluding the periods of 2020 and 2021 calendar years], to date and if reinvested than the total value of the crime is more than U$D 250bn.

The main entities implicated in this longstanding injustice and crime of over U$250bn are respectively: South African Reserve Bank (SARB)  in particular Financial Markets Department and Subsidiaries (State–Owned), Public Investment Commissioners / Corporation (PIC), Corporation of Public Deposits (CPD), Barclays Bank PLC and ABSA Group Ltd. That history evidenced in loads of documents, significant interactions with politicians and officials, state-owned institutions and banks is best understood in the deposed affidavit of Edward Jeff Koorbanally.

This case currently before the Western Cape High Court equally has the following as people of interest, against whom the allegations stand that they failed to investigate the matter, which may constitute a claim of a cover-up of the crimes, rendering them complicit crime. These are for the periods they served respectively in office: Trevor Manuel Finance Minister in his capacity as sole trustee of the PIC, Pravin Gordhan (Finance Minister), Tito Mboweni (Governor of the SARB & Finance Minister), Gill Marcus (Governor of the SARB / ABSA Chairperson), Maria Ramos (DG of Treasury/CEO of ABSA), Lesetja Kganyago (Treasury / SARB), Lungisa Fuzile (Treasury), Daniel Mminele (Deputy Governor SARB), Johan de Jager (Head of Legal SARB), Yunus Carrim, (SCOF) Themba Godi SCOPA Chair) and Baleka Mbete (Speaker of Parliament).

As legitimate as the claim for the Surtie family inheritance is,  the truth is that the actual money as transferred for inheritance does not exist anymore. Therefore, the hunt for any real money is a hunt into oblivion since apartheid led Treasury converted it into SA- trading bonds. When we say money does not exist anymore, it is not any concession that it never existed.

The traced record immanent in bank accounts in the name of Lesotho based ART Surtie and subsequent allotted #00004444 particular account would show transactions of payments with an origin of UK Barclays to those as mentioned earlier made with intended Lesotho based beneficiary the late ART Surtie.

Naturally, the question arises, what is meant with money does not exist anymore? Again,  we have to hear Koorbanally as cited in his affidavit when he explains how the money was transferred into bond designations R150 and R153, respectively. A contextual relook of what South Africa depicted in financial status is vital since it casts light on why the apartheid Treasury opted to initiate these specific actions. By 1985, the apartheid government suffering under the weight of sanctions and programmes of international divestment found itself literally bankrupt and seriously in need of money. It had access to this money of Surtie but recognised it could not steal it.

Instead, it created the enabling legislation to facilitate the conversion of such money into bonds to float for the betterment of the country, at least the country they defined. In this sense, some may argue their act was patriotic and noble.
Regulations related to interventions to the Currency and Exchange Act of 1993 details a set of periodic amendments from September 1985, including December 1985, March 1986, May 1987, May 1990, October 1933, and extended up to August 2001. The Government Gazette detailed in Regulation Gazette Nr. R1570 Proclamation dated 2 September 1985 confirming the then State President making regulations contained in Schedule 2: “No person shall with effect from 1 January  1986 until 1 March 1986 makes any payment to or in favour of foreign creditors accept payment in special restricted account except payments in respect of…”

This periodic adjustment of legislation equally occurred in marked epochs of apartheid, transitional and ultimately democratic era governments.  That includes, as alluded to, subsequent legislative amendments as dated 22 October 1993, which notes an Extraordinary Gazette Nr. 2098 that details the initiative of the Government of National Unity in a transitional period. New legislation in line with  Schedule  2, followed in the same vein and the letter of the law of the initial September 1985 amendment when it categorically states: “No person shall with effect from I January until 15 August 2001, makes any payment to any foreign creditor  except payment into a special restricted account.” As a direct result of amendments to Act 9 of 1993, the maturity dates were now adjusted to  2006 and 2011, respectively.

Since 16 August 2001, no legal justification exists for the retention of funds in the restricted account.

Suppose one assumes the African National Congress not to have known of this apartheid crime of converting a foreigner ART Surtie’s rightful money and therefore being set up. In that case, one could, as Koorbanally concluded, deduce a case for economic sabotage and terrorism. Yet, Koorbanally was surprised to find that the apartheid actors wholly apprised the democratic era role players related to this matter. We can therefore accept that the democratic era players in Treasury were not blindfolded but acted in full and sober knowledge. It is here that a case for complicity to a crime of an act of wilful concealment of a particular kind.

According to Koorbanally, the ANC and its due representatives were nakedly aware, as duly informed by their apartheid National Party counterparts. That awareness detailed that the previous regime used Lesotho,  Namibia,  Botswana and the UK citizens.  It is estimated that each of these constituted R36bn per individual with the UK based Bernard Blazer as the paymaster, who in all probability had twice the respective inheritance of those as mentioned earlier. One could surmise that the ANC players were told we played our part to ensure the country  was bankrolled. It is now up to you to play your part since the likelihood of this ever being uncovered remains virtually impossible.

The concealment claim on post-apartheid political power and finance ministry in the broader crime is best understood in the central role of the Ministry of Treasury. Koorbanally contends that one of Trevor Manuel’s first things when he became minister of finance was to continue the concealment of the original Surtie money unilaterally. We can thus contend that Manuel’s predecessor did not necessarily commit a crime but created prejudice. The actual crime of concealment was the act of the democratic era as initiated by the first minister of finance and followed by his successive ministers. The claims levelled are that while Manuel was the face of Treasury, Maria Ramos was the de facto minister of finance. At the advent of Manuel, the pension fund of SA sat on R7,8bn, which essentially was to take care of all the pay-outs as his predecessor. The pension fund following these pay-outs was empty and closer to a zero balance than what could be appreciated.

Despite this known reality of a bankrupt SA and a broke pension fund, the Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, in 1996 declared a pension fund with a healthy balance sheet above R127bn. It naturally raises the cardinal question of the origin of this publicly stated positive balance sheet of the pension fund. Questions as from where this R127bn suddenly was harvested from as reflecting in the pension fund announced by Manuel? Not having access to how the R127bn was gathered in natural origin, one is compelled to inquire what reasonable means in a historical context could have accommodated such arrival of funds in a broke pension fund. To appreciate how monies could have surfaced in the pension fund, one of two legislative processes needed to be followed to appreciate how monies could have appeared in the pension fund. In the first instance, the law compels the development of an appropriation bill that could only be made possible through it being passed in parliament.

This, however, never happened and cannot be sidestepped. The plausibility for such a transaction is anchored in a constitutional setting, meaning legislation that permits the transfer of funds from Revenue is the constitution. The constitution, however, only allows the transfer of money from the Revenue to settle or pay the national debt.  The national debt, if it was the case, was never disclosed. It became crucial to convert the asset’s ownership into the newly formed entity Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF), created by Manuel under Mandela’s presidency. This entity now hosting the assets had another interesting singular authority in warm body trustee,  namely the Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel.  A process that continued from 1996 to 2004. It is claimed that equally so, the Minister of Finance was also the sole trustee of the Public Investment Commissioners (PIC).

The ownership of the bonds was reassigned to an entity under the singular control of one person. 2001/2 introduced the splitting of the three-legged bonds. Bonds R150 and R153 were split to alter the respective identities. The new identities could assume, for example, R157, R158 and R159, rendering the original as evaporated. Splitting the bonds allowed all maturities and interest to trade independently and delink them from the original and historical context, officially discontinued.  This intervention reduced the values of the Bonds for each in equal portions of three. They further stripped the  Bonds into interest splits of multiples, for example, 20. So that by the envisaged time of maturity, these original bonds given the subjection to partitions and strips were virtually non-existent. They were splitting and stripping rendered each interest beneficiary different ownership.

These acts of splitting followed by stripping then continued the second tier of concealment. The first was the actual money being transferred into bonds without the original owner’s permission. Interest as a financial reality is governed by constitutional legislation that guarantees the original investor the right to earn. In the instance of the bonds, interests are part twice a year. Six-month interest, therefore, is payable while the newly created bond trades for another year under another name. For every year, two people benefitted from the interest for 2001 until the envisaged maturity dates.

It is perhaps essential to appreciate that earning interest is a constitutionally guaranteed right for designated investors or owners of the asset.   Meaning it is legal for interest to accrue and subsequently paid to the investor.  With the original owner removed the new storage of the assets detailing the entities of GEPF and PIC, the interest was paid out. However, to whom remains a mystery in this intricate scheme of making the actual money firstly. Subsequently, the original bonds disappear. The challenge is that when the original owner would look for the money that made up the bonds, he is bound to run into a brick wall.

As per Koorbanally’s affidavit, the discovery of what happened in 2001. unveiled the crime since, without such information, there would have been no case. The truth is the designated maturity dates for R150 and R153, immanent in 2005 and 2010 respectively, would be non-existent, rendering anyone who claims such in existence the arduous task to prove the actual existence.  The specified R150 and R153 detailed specific distinguishable respective Capital and accrued Interest portions as per Koorbanally’s affidavit. This process now augmented the maturity dates. Equally so, R186, which is a derivative of the original R150 bond, was similarly split.

It is essential to understand that all this occurred within the PIC, now known as the Public Investment Company. The PIC reports to the Treasury, the custodian of the State, better explained as the shareholder.  Koorbanally contends that while the concealment of actual money into bonds that were subsequently subjected to a complex repetitive set of splits and strips details a highly sophisticated mechanism. Koorbanally holds that perhaps one error was committed. However, the error is twofold: firstly, bonds are traceable and that tracing cannot be delinked from the original account. In this instance, the bank account of Surtie #00004444, which was not a regular but special account,  was used; thus, the link between the historical money and the new forms of bond identities used as a trading account for the bonds.